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Abstract 
The microfinance industry in Vietnam, particularly those sponsored by non-government 
organisations (NGOs), has experienced rapid expansion in recent years. While there 
have been anecdotal reports alluding to their contribution in alleviating poverty, a 
systematic analysis of this issue has been lacking. In a bid to help address this 
shortcoming, this paper reports on data that was obtained during a survey and interview 
process that incorporated various stakeholders including financial donors, NGO-
sponsored microfinance institutions (NMPs), village leaders and NMP members and non-
members. Firstly, the nature of NMPs is described - their objectives, target groups and 
the financial products they offer. Secondly, perceptions of NMPs effectiveness are 
discussed from the standpoint of various stakeholders. NMPs are found to be at a critical 
juncture. While their activities are widely perceived to contribute to poverty alleviation, 
their future viability is clouded by donor requirements that they become financially self-
sufficient. At the same time, certain government policies make achieving this goal very 
difficult. 
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1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The microfinance industry in Vietnam has been growing rapidly. In particular, the 
number of non-government organisation (NGO)-sponsored microfinance programs 
(NMPs) has grown from a mere handful in the early 1990s to currently more than 60 
(BWTP, 2005). There is a widely held belief that this expansion has contributed to 
poverty reduction. For example, comprehensive surveys such as the Vietnam Living 
Standard Survey (VLSS) show that as the percentage of rural population with access to 
rural finance programs (i.e., microfinance and others) increased from 23 percent in 1993 
to 40 percent in 1998, the poverty rate dropped from 58 percent to 37 percent (GSO, 
1994; 2000). However, beyond this largely anecdotal evidence, what has been distinctly 
lacking is a systematic analysis of the nature and effectiveness of microfinance.  
 
Since 2003, the authors have been involved in a research program that has sought to 
address these shortcomings. In early 2004, a survey and interview process was conducted 
in order to collect additional primary data and included various stakeholders such as 
financial donors, NMPs, village leaders and NMP members and non-members1. The 
survey and interview process had two main purposes – a. to gain an understanding of the 
current nature of microfinance in Vietnam such as the objectives of NMPs, their target 
groups, the financial products they offer, etc, and b. collect both qualitative and 
quantitative data that would allow conclusions to be drawn on the efficiency of NMPs 
(i.e., their ability to convert inputs such as labour and capital into outputs such as 
financial products) and the effectiveness of their operations (i.e., the impact their 
financial products have on achieving objectives such as alleviating poverty). This paper 
reports on and discusses a subset of the data that was obtained. Section 2 provides a brief 
descriptive overview of rural finance in Vietnam. Section 3 briefly outlines the survey 
process and elaborates on the findings with respect to the nature of NMP operations. 
Section 4 draws out two key themes from the survey and interview process that relate to 
                                                 
1 Translated copies of the surveys administered are available from the authors on request. 
  
2
matters of effectiveness from the perspectives of various stakeholders. Section 5 contains 
concluding comments.  
 
Much of the discussion regarding NMP effectiveness in this paper is based on data that is 
qualitative in nature and relates to perceptions of effectiveness rather than what might be 
termed actual effectiveness.  At least in economic research, such data is often looked 
upon as being the poor cousin of quantitative data and analysis techniques. We respond in 
several ways. Firstly, there is nothing in the nature of qualitative and quantitative data 
that make them competing. Ideally, both should be used and research evidence is at its 
most convincing when both qualitative and quantitative data point in the same direction. 
Further research drawing on the survey data is planned and will take on a more 
quantitative orientation. Secondly, notions of inclusiveness and participatory practice in 
development projects demand that perceptions be given weight in their own right. This is 
not simply out of deference to some ethical imperative. Integrating perceptions serves a 
pragmatic end as it is often perceptions that dictate what is and what is not possible and 
hence actual outcomes. As will later be discussed, this is certainly the case with respect to 
microfinance in Vietnam. Thirdly, the quantitative analysis of efficiency and 
effectiveness in microfinance is sometimes problematic. Efficiency analysis is typically 
based around the specification of a production function that relates inputs to outputs. Yet, 
in the context of microfinance, it is not even clear what the inputs and outputs should be - 
savings deposits, for example, could rightly be regarded as both an input and an output. 
Similarly, deciphering the effectiveness of microfinance programs in tackling poverty 
(which itself is not amendable to easy measurement) requires the collection of data on an 
array of control variables since the services provided by NMPs are usually part of a much 
broader poverty alleviation strategy. Each data series in the array will be costly to obtain 
and subject to a degree of measurement error. Quite simply, if a researcher wishes to 
know the effectiveness of microfinance, one of the best means available is simply to ask 
the various stakeholders for their perceptions.  
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2 OVERVIEW OF RURAL FINANCE IN VIETNAM 
Before the start of the economic reform policy (doi moi) in 1986, the formal rural 
financial sector in Vietnam comprised mainly of traditional credit cooperatives, which 
were considered representatives of the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV). The first wave of 
financial sector reform came in 1988 (BWTP, 2005). A key new player to emerge was 
the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD), which was 
established in 1990 as a policy bank charged with dispensing subsidised credit from the 
SBV to the rural poor. In 1995, VBARD began transforming itself into a commercial 
bank. At that time, the Vietnam Bank for the Poor (VBP) was established to take over the 
reigns of delivering subsidised credit for poverty alleviation. The VLSS 2002 revealed 
that the VBP accounted for 58.26 percent of the total outstanding loans to poor, rural 
households (Table 1). In 2003, the VBP was reformed as the Vietnam Bank for Social 
Policies (VBSP) and began to expand further on its branch network as well as target 
additional groups such as poor students and disabled and migration workers. A 
distinguishing operational characteristic of the VBSP is that it has a negative spread 
between the subsidised interest rate it charges on loans and the interest rate it pays to 
depositors. To cover its policy lending activities, VBSP receives annual transfers from 
the national government budget and operates as a non-profit entity (BWTP, 2005).  
 
After suffering from a financial collapse in the late 1980s, traditional credit cooperatives 
were reborn in the form of rural shareholding banks (RSHBs) or People’s Cooperative 
Funds (PCFs). While the number of RSHBs reached 44 by 1995, that number fell to 19 
by 2001 and they now play only a marginal role (UNDP, 1996; Llanto, 2000; BWTP, 
2005). PCFs were established on the model of the Caisse Populaire system in Quebec, 
Canada (Hung, 1998). They operate under Vietnam’s cooperative law and only provide 
loans for members, although savings are mobilised from both members and non-
members. As of November 2004, there were 901 PCFs in operation. In 2003, this formal 
financial sector (VBP, VBARD, PCFs) represented over 90 percent of the outreach of 
rural financial services in Vietnam (BWTP, 2005). Apart from the above institutions, 
there are government-related institutions such as the TYM fund established in 1993 by 
the Women’s Union of Soc Son district in Hanoi and the CEP fund established in 1992 
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by the Labour Confederation of Ho Chi Minh City. The main difference between these 
funds and banks such as VBP is that they do not receive funds directly from the 
government. Rather, in similar vein to NMPs, their donors include international 
organisations such as AusAID and the Grameen Trust. Their government connections 
(such as through the Women’s Union and the Labour Confederation) however do provide 
them with a network that vastly exceeds that of an average NMP. The latest data shows 
that the CEP fund has reached 50,000 clients (BWTP, 2005) and the TYM fund serves 
nearly 19,000 members (Tran and Yun, 2004).  
 
In addition to the above government-owned and related institutions, NMPs began to 
merge in the early 1990s. It is these institutions that are the focus of this paper. Domestic 
NGO-sponsored programs are few largely because a declaration of separateness from 
government is still an awkward concept in contemporary Vietnam. NMPs generally 
function on models derived from overseas experience and can be classified according to 
three groups, namely Grameen Bank replicas, Village Bank models and Solidarity Group 
models (Nguyen, 2004). The Grameen Bank model is followed by most NGOs in 
Vietnam such as Vietnam Plus and Action Aid as well as government-related institutions 
such as the TYM and CEP funds. In this model, microfinance members establish 
themselves in groups of five with no family or marriage relations and each person acts as 
a guarantor for other persons in the group to get loans. Group members meet frequently 
to contribute savings and repay interest and principal by instalments. The second model is 
the Village Bank model, which was originally devised by the International Community 
Support Organization (FINCA) in the mid 1980s. The main difference between the 
Grameen replica and the Village Bank model is that the latter involves members actually 
holding an ownership share of the institution from its instatement. The NGOs operating 
this model include Save the Children Japan and World Vision (BWTP, 2005). The third 
model is the Solidarity Group Model, which was instituted by an American-based NGO, 
ACCION International. In this model, loans are provided to groups rather than 
individuals. Members of groups divide the loan equally among themselves. This model 
has been applied by NGOs such as Save the Children US and Adventist Development and 
Relief Agency International (ADRA). Apart from the above three models, there is an 
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initiative by the Save the Children US to establish a joint-venture with a private company 
and a commercial bank to deliver microfinance services on commercial basis. It does not 
receive any donor subsidy. This venture aims to utilise the hands-on community 
development experience of NGOs, the fund mobilisation potential of private investors 
and the labour productivity of commercial banks. Since the venture has only been in 
operation for about one year, it is too early to gauge its success (Dinh, 2005). Credit 
extended by institutions such as CEP, TYM and NMPs accounted for around 8 percent of 
the total to poor, rural households (Table 1). 
 
The rural financial sector in Vietnam also includes an informal sector. Such providers 
include moneylenders, friends and relatives and rotating savings and credit associations 
(ROSCAs). Until the mid-1990s, the informal sector was estimated to be the most 
important source of credit for Vietnamese households, especially in rural areas. 
According to the results of the VLSS 1992 survey, 73 percent of rural credit was 
provided by the informal sector (McCarty, 2001a). Although its importance has declined 
with the expansion of the formal sector described above, according to the VLSS 2002 
survey, the informal sector continues to provide 10.71 percent of credit extended to poor, 
rural households (Table 1). There will always be a niche for informal lenders, particularly 
as they tend to offer more scope for borrowers to use loans for non-production related 
purposes.  
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Table 1. Access of the poor to credit and main providers  
Providers 
Category 
Percentage of poor 
H
H
s accessed to credit 
V
B
P 
V
B
A
R
D
 
O
ther banks 
Job C
reation 
Program
 
PC
F 
Social organisations 
(e.g., N
G
O
s) 
Private lenders 
R
elatives and 
friends 
Overall 32.46 57.76 23.25 1.11 3.73 2.83 7.98 4.07 6.64
A- Rural/Urban   
Urban 31.36 53.89 19.02 1.09 4.76 2.70 15.63 3.52 5.88
Rural 32.60 58.26 23.79 1.12 3.60 2.85 7.00 4.14 6.73
B- Household heads   
Male 35.43 58.20 23.81 1.12 3.43 2.63 7.36 4.19 6.77
Female 25.07 56.21 21.29 1.10 4.80 3.52 10.18 3.65 6.15
Source: General Statistics Office (2005) 
 
3 THE NATURE OF NMP MICROFINANCE - SURVEY AND FINDINGS 
3.1 The survey 
Data for this study comes from two main surveys: an institutional survey and a survey of 
households.  The institutional survey was aimed at NMPs listed in the NGO directory. 
This directory is maintained by the Vietnam NGO Resource Centre 
(www.ngocentre.org.vn). NGOs that agreed to participate in the survey and that were 
based in Hanoi received a questionnaire followed by a face to face interview. Those 
based outside Hanoi or who had already transferred the program to local partners 
received a questionnaire by post or email as preferred. Survey responses were received 
from 44 NMPs operated by 23 NGOs (of which 21 were international NGOs) and were 
concentrated in the north and the central regions of Vietnam. The focus on these regions 
was primarily due to time and resource constraints. Nevertheless, given that the majority 
of NMPs operate in the central and northern regions (McCarty, 2001b), this response 
affords a reasonable level of confidence that the included sample is representative of the 
microfinance community in Vietnam.   
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The household survey was implemented using a stratified sampling design. Initially, 10 
NMPs were selected equally from the two regions (five in the north and five in the 
centre). For each NMP, a list of member villages and non-member villages were defined 
and a member village was chosen randomly from each list for the ‘treatment’ group and a 
non-member village was selected for the ‘control’ group. To make a proper comparison, 
the study did not select non-participating villages randomly from the list of all villages 
that had not received microfinance in the region. Instead, only villages that met eligibility 
criteria (typically those that were on a government defined list of poor villages) and had 
not received microfinance services were selected. In each village, households were 
selected randomly from the list of eligible households. Where a non-member village was 
not available (i.e., all eligible villages in the area had received the service), an attempt 
was made to identify eligible households in member villages who had not received the 
financial services. The household surveys covered 26 villages (of which 17 were member 
villages) and 471 households (of which 287 were member households). Apart from the 
survey of households, interviews were conducted with heads of surveyed villages to 
obtain information on village characteristics and their perceptions relating to 
microfinance. Village heads are elected by constituents and then approved by the 
commune people’s committee (CPC) to lead the village. Thus, village heads can be 
categorised as belonging to the local government. Several semi-structured interviews 
with CPC representatives were also conducted. 
 
In addition to the interviews and surveys described above, group discussions were 
moderated during two workshops held in Hanoi. The first workshop was held in February 
2004 and introduced the research project to stakeholders. It was attended by 
representatives from the SBV, donors, local and international NGOs and representatives 
from the Women’s Union (WU). The Women’s Union is one of five so-called mass 
organisations in Vietnam (others include the Youth Union, Farmers Union, etc) that act 
as a bridge between the Community Party of Vietnam (CPV) and society as a whole. It 
plays an important role in Vietnamese microfinance because the target group of most 
NMPs is women. Therefore, when a NMP approaches a local government to elicit 
support for their microfinance program, the WU will usually be assigned as a partnering 
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body. The second workshop was held in May 2004 after the survey and interview process 
had been undertaken and afforded the opportunity for preliminary findings to be 
presented and discussed.  
 
3.2 Objectives of NMPs 
The NMPs that were surveyed were asked to nominate the main objectives of their 
schemes and to rank the relative importance of these objectives on a three-point scale 
(very important, important, and less important). Responses were received from 30 NMPs. 
All indicated that helping the poor access financial services was one of their main 
objectives and 29 of the 30 ranked it a very important objective. There was also firm 
evidence to conclude that most NMPs aspire to achieve financial self-sufficiency (ie., no 
longer be dependant on donor support), with only 2 of the 30 respondents not considering 
it a main objective of their scheme. Of the 28 NMPs that did consider it a main objective, 
25 described it as being important. The third most common objective reported by 14 of 
the 30 respondents was to generate a profit. This should not be taken to imply that many 
NMPs have a commercial rather than development orientation. All of the NMPs that 
nominated generating a profit as being a main objective described it as being less 
important and also nominated at least one of the other objectives described above as 
being another main objective of their scheme. Thus, a more nuanced interpretation is that 
a sizeable proportion of NMPs view generating a profit as a means of better achieving 
financial self-sufficiency and helping the poor access financial services. Related to this 
issue is that a regular point to emerge in interviews was that the longer the NMP had been 
in operation, the higher the priority that tended to be accorded to achieving financial self-
sufficiency and generating a profit. This is explained by the fact that while most donor 
agencies are prepared to provide start up funds and subsidise the operations of an NMP 
for a period of time such support is rarely indefinite.  
 
3.3 Target groups and beneficiaries 
Responses were received from 44 NMPs in regards to their target groups and 
beneficiaries. All identified women as being their target group, especially those who were 
also members of the WU. The priority given to women by NMPs in Vietnam is consistent 
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with international practices (eg. Grameen Bank in Bangladesh). An initially surprising 
finding was that the institutional survey showed that despite the stated importance 
accorded to the objective of helping the poor access financial services, on average, only 
41.5 percent of microfinance members could be classified as being poor according to the 
national poverty line. What transpired was that many NMPs preferred to use locally 
derived measures of poverty to distinguish between the poor and non-poor. One common 
approach is participatory wealth ranking (PWR) activities, where a selected group of 
villagers rank all households in the village using a series of indicators such as income, 
housing condition, household accessories, production equipment, education of children, 
etc. Sometimes poverty incidence as measured by the national poverty line and the PWR 
poverty measure differ considerably. For example, an NMP run by the Rural 
Development Services Centre (RDSC), a Vietnamese NGO to which the first author is 
affiliated, recorded 60 percent of their members households as being poor using PWR. 
However, by using the national poverty line only 17 percent would be considered poor. 
Another possible reason for members being non-poor is that by the time the survey was 
conducted some had already benefited from program and escaped poverty. Yet another 
factor that emerged in interviews was that some members, although not considered poor 
themselves, wished to stay in NMPs to maintain a social network.  The poor from ethnic 
minority groups are on the whole not well represented amongst the ranks of NMP 
members. In aggregate, members of ethnic minority groups accounted for 29.3 percent of 
the total members surveyed. This figure may sound impressive given that the percentage 
of minority groups in the population as a whole is only 13.8 percent (GSO, 2005). 
However, it is distorted in the sense that it is a mean rather than a median figure. Apart 
from a couple of larger schemes that focus almost exclusively on ethnic minority groups, 
the majority have very little dealings with them at all. According to many of the NMPs 
interviewed, ethnic minority groups, with the exception of the Chinese group, depend 
mainly on subsistence agriculture and hence the introduction of cash through 
microfinance services was thought to be of little use to improving their production and 
livelihood. In an attempt to overcome this problem, some NGOs have introduced in-kind 
credit or revolving funds of inputs such as seed and animals. Another barrier is that most 
ethnic minority groups in Vietnam live in remote areas, creating very high transaction 
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costs due to travel difficulties, language barriers, and limited numeracy skills (Che, 
2002).  
 
3.4 Financial products 
There were only two financial services offered by the NMPs surveyed - credit and 
savings products. Many NMPs actually described themselves as being Credit and Saving 
Programs. Other products such as microinsurance and money transfers are rarely 
available, except in the funds that are connected to the government by virtue of their 
larger scale and more established networks. For example, the CEP fund provides 
insurance for health and livestock and the TYM scheme provides death insurance to 
members and their families. Most of the NMPs interviewed were not enthusiastic about 
establishing insurance operations. The main reason was because their staff are frugally 
trained in even basic banking products. Another perceived problem was a lack of 
insurance product awareness amongst the rural poor in Vietnam that would limit its 
uptake. The survey also revealed that 79 percent of the credit borrowed by members was 
for investment purposes. This reflects rules in 69 percent of NMPs that loans are only to 
be used for production purposes. The most common types of investment from 
microfinance loans include animal husbandry, crops and off-farm businesses. The 
proportion of credit extended for on-farm uses was identified by some NMPs as being 
somewhat incongruent with the microfinance principle of small, regular loan repayments 
as these types of investment tend to generate seasonal (or longer) fluctuations in income. 
Of the credit that was extended for consumption purposes, the most common uses were 
education fees for children, health care and food. All NMPs applied the principle of 
social collateral rather than physical collateral in their credit service. In the case a 
borrower defaults, group members are responsible for repaying the loan or face the 
possibility of being excluded from future loans. Default is also commonly discouraged 
through the required contribution of compulsory savings, which will be blocked and 
retained in case of default. Some schemes also invited a representative of local 
government (e.g., village heads) to the supervision board. Since NMPs are often 
integrated into other development activities, the local government has an incentive to 
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help NGOs by enforcing intentional defaulters to repay. The design of NMP credit (i.e., 
small loan sizes and regular instalments) is also held to protect against default.  
 
The saving service provided by NMPs consists of a compulsory and voluntary 
component. In all NMPs surveyed, the compulsory saving account is not for withdrawal 
unless members want to quit the programs. The purpose of this compulsory account is 
three-fold. First, it creates a buffer in case of default as described above. Second, it 
creates a habit of regular saving practice amongst members. Third, the saving fund helps 
to build an awareness of ownership amongst the members. The amount of compulsory 
saving required per member household was found to be relatively little ranging from 
VND 5,000 to VND 15,000 per month. The average rural income in Vietnam is VND 
220,000 per person per month (GSO, 2005). Voluntary savings are designed to mobilise 
additional resources from the community. Opening a voluntary savings account with a 
NMP can be a convenient and attractive option. For example, the interest rate paid on 
savings in the NMPs surveyed was around 0.6 percent per month (Table 2). This 
compared with 0.25-0.4 percent per month on offer at banks such as VBARD at the time. 
According to current legislation (to be discussed in more detail later), NMPs are only 
allowed to mobilise voluntary savings from their members. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive data from NMPs surveyed  
 Units Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Number of members Persons 2382 800 68 19508
Number of borrowers Persons 2231 691 48 19608
Average loan size '000 VND 988 787 318 4471
Loan interest rate Percent/month 1.28 1.20 0.80 1.70
Loan term Months 14 12 6 36
Number of savers Persons 2045 631 0.00 19508
Average saving amount '000 VND 220 149 10 1000
Saving interest rate Percent/month 0.60 0.60 0.40 0.85
 
4 STAKEHOLDERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF EFFECTIVENESS 
In this section we report perceptions surrounding the effectiveness of microfinance from 
the perspective of various stakeholders including village leaders, donors, NMPs, 
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members and non-members. In order to make the commentary tractable, two basic 
themes have been drawn from the survey responses and interviews conducted.  
 
4.1 Microfinance programs were perceived by members and village leaders as being 
effective in alleviating poverty 
When members of NMPs were asked what their expectations were when they joined, 95 
percent stated that they had expected participation would increase their incomes. When 
subsequently asked whether their expectation had been fulfilled to date, 99.3 percent 
reported that it had.  
 
Follow-up questions were asked in a bid to determine what exactly it was about the 
services provided by NMPs that had led to this positive perception. The most common 
response was simply that NMPs provided them with access to financial services, 
particularly credit. Members reported a vital need for credit as the nature of their rural 
production meant that incomes fluctuated according to season. Members were also asked 
what they would have done if they had been unable to access a loan from a NMP. A 
significant proportion (35 percent) said they would have foregone the investment. To the 
extent that investment is a key determinant of future incomes, the perception that access 
to credit had improved their incomes is justifiable. It was also interesting to note that 45 
percent of members said that had they not been able to borrow from NMPs they would 
have resorted to borrowing from moneylenders. This is despite the fact that the interest 
rate charged by moneylenders is usually three to five times that charged by NMPs 
(McCarthy, 2001a). This willingness to borrow at higher interest rates implies that many 
would-be borrowers do have access to high return projects.  Non-members also reported a 
positive disposition towards the services provided by NMPs. When asked if they would 
be interested in joining a microfinance program if one was available in their area and if 
they were deemed eligible, 99 percent said they would be. The most common reason 
given for their interest was to gain access to credit services. One caveat that needs to be 
made clear when reporting the positive perceptions associated with the services offered 
by NMPs is that the interest rate they charged on loans is in most cases a subsidised rate. 
The interest rate charged by government-owned banks such as VBP is subsidised even 
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more heavily. This issue will be discussed in more detail later but suffice to say here that 
the extension of cheap credit will expectedly promote positive perceptions and lead to 
robust demand.  
 
In regards to the positive features associated with the services provided by NMPs, other 
common responses were a) 70.1 percent said they liked the simple and quick loan 
application procedure, and b) 65.1 percent said they liked the flexibility in loan 
repayments. The average time borrowers reported having to wait for a loan approval was 
only a couple of days and the paperwork consisted of a one-page loan application form. 
There were no physical collateral requirements and borrowers typically repaid loans in 
small monthly instalments. In contrast, at least until recently, the standard loan from 
VBARD required physical collateral, was for a period of three years and required the 
lump sum repayment of interest and principal. Aside from providing increased access to 
financial services, one of the chief justifications undergirding the microfinance 
movement worldwide is that NMPs are better able to serve the poor because they are 
more flexible and innovative than formal banking institutions. The responses we received 
lend support this assertion.  
 
The perceptions of village leaders were also sought regarding the effectiveness of 
financial services (including but not limited to microfinance). Village leaders were asked 
to nominate the relative priority areas for alleviating poverty in their communities. 
Notable was the fact that financial services, alongside infrastructure, ranked as being the 
most important priority areas. These two areas ranked ahead of other expectedly worthy 
areas such as health care and education (see Table 3). The penchant of village leaders for 
increased access to financial services can also be at least partly explained by the 
widespread practice of interest rate subsidisation. In this way the practice may be said to 
distort the priorities of village heads in favour of financial services vis-a-vis areas such as 
education and health care. The fondness of village leaders for financial services and 
infrastructure might also be explained by the fact that additional resources in these areas 
result in outputs that are more immediate and visible than spending in education and 
health care.  
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Table 3. What are the relative priority areas to alleviate poverty in your 
community? 
Ranking (percent) Factors 
Average 
priority
High 
priority 
Very high 
priority
Financial services (loans, credit, savings) 3.8 57.7 38.5
Infrastructure (roads, electricity, irrigation) 3.8 50.0 46.2
Health care 38.5 61.5 0.0
Education 38.5 57.7 3.8
Production services (agricultural extension, 
job training, processing) 
47.8 47.8 4.3
 
4.2 Microfinance institutions perceived that government policies would largely 
determine their ability to exert a positive impact over the medium and long term 
When NMPs were asked open-ended questions regarding what they considered to be the 
main factors promoting and hindering their operations in Vietnam, the role played by the 
government came up prominently in both instances.  On a positive note, it was said that it 
was not uncommon for the local government to provide operational support. This support 
often came in the form of an in-kind staffing subsidy through the WU. In addition, the 
local government also sometimes provided free (or heavily subsidised) office space. One 
NMP also reported that best practice in microfinance had been promoted through the 
official media.   
 
On a more negative note, two issues stood out. Firstly, 93 percent of NMPs raised the 
official policy of government-owned banks extending subsidised credit. This point turned 
out to be closely related to the fact that when NMP members were asked what they 
disliked about the services NMPs offered, 51 percent responded that the interest rate they 
levied on loans was too high. Interviews with NMPs revealed the problem was primarily 
that members made judgements regarding the suitability of the interest rate by comparing 
it with the rate charged by government-owned banks. At the time of the interviews, for 
example, the VBP was charging 0.7-0.8 percent per month whilst the typical NMP 
charged around 1.2 percent per month (Table 2). The rate charged by NMPs was on a par 
with that charged by VBARD. What is important to note is that NMPs reported to being 
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effectively duty bound not to charge in excess of this rate since to do so would be to 
invite claims of exploiting the poor.  NMPs contended that their members were largely 
unaware that the interest rate charged by banks such as VBP was a subsidised one. 
Lenhart (2000) has claimed that the interest rate offered by the VBP at the time was 
around half that which would be consistent with cost recovery. Along similar lines, some 
NMPs stated that their members felt they were obligated to provide lower rates of interest 
since they were billed as development programs. 
 
The implication here is that as long as government-owned banks offer subsidised interest 
rates, it can be expected that NMP members will express dissatisfaction regarding the 
interest rate charged by NMPs. This perception presents a serious conundrum for NMPs 
in Vietnam. While members report to benefiting from the programs in place, if the 
official policy of interest rate subsidisation is maintained NMPs will be limited in their 
ability to charge an interest rate that would be consistent with financial self-sufficiency. 
And as was noted earlier, while donor organisations typically accept responsibility for 
subsidising operations during the initial set-up period, over time they expect the programs 
will become self-sufficient. 
  
The second major hindrance – raised by 82 percent of respondent NMPs – was related to 
the regulatory framework surrounding NMPs. At the time the surveys and interviews 
were conducted, NMPs were operating without any supporting legislation that defined 
and protected their operations. Some also complained that government policies relating to 
matters such as labour recruitment and taxation requirements were unclear. In this 
respect, one might expect that the decree released in March 2005 on the organisation and 
operation of microfinance institutions in Vietnam would be welcome. And in many ways 
it was. For the first time, NMPs had a formal document that defined the types of financial 
services they were permitted to engage in and were given legal protection covering their 
operations. However, while it is still too early to confidently predict the long run impact 
of this legislation, there are some worrying issues. The decree by the SBV sets out 
minimum legal capital requirements for NMPs. For those that do not accept voluntary 
deposits, the minimum legal capital requirement is VND 500 million (≈$US 32,000). For 
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those that do, the requirement jumps to VND 5 billion (≈$US 320,000) report (ADB, 
2003) for the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the SBV on the regulatory framework 
surrounding microfinance institutions in Vietnam, Price Waterhouse Coopers wrote that 
the typical range for microfinance institutions internationally was between $US 60,000 - 
$US 100,000. Data from our survey showed that only 32 percent of NMPs had start-up 
capital of more than VND 500 million and no NMP had VND 5 billion. According to the 
decree, NMPs that do not satisfy these minimum requirements within two years, will be 
required to stop their microfinance activities.  
 
Aside from the interest rate being considered too high, the next most common criticism 
of NMPs, which was raised by 42 percent of member respondents, was that the loan size 
on offer was too small. From the perspective of the NMP, smaller loans served several 
beneficial ends. Firstly, they helped to screen the rich out from accessing to microfinance. 
Having physical collateral, the rich would often prefer to access credit through one of the 
banks such as VBARD rather than incur the opportunity costs that relate to borrowing 
money from an NMP (regular meetings, etc).  Secondly, it was considered a training 
process for the poor to manage their loans. Thirdly, the small loan size allowed the NMP 
to reach more clients. The latter is a practical consideration forced upon NMPs already 
heavily reliant on donors for loanable funds. The ratio between local funds (ie. from 
member savings) and total loanable funds amongst the NMPs surveyed was on average 
just 19.3 percent. There were only three programs in the sample that had a ratio of more 
than 50 percent. From a poverty reduction standpoint, this constraint is worrying since 
the small average loan size and ensuing complaints imply that some potentially 
productive projects are going unfunded due to the lumpy, indivisible nature of investment 
(McKinnon, 1973). While there may well be an economic justification for concluding 
that NMPs should offer larger loans, there is clearly an interplay between this issue and 
the government policies raised above.  It is hard to see how NMPs will be able to attract 
the additional funds they need to be able to offer larger loans when they are hamstrung 
with respect to the interest rates they charge (because of the subsidised interest rate in 
government-owned banks) and in accepting voluntary deposits from members and non-
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members (by legislation restricting their services to members and imposing high 
minimum legal capital requirements).  
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
NMPs in Vietnam are now at a critical juncture. Somewhat ironically, the question marks 
over their future are in spite of their own continued professed dedication to helping the 
poor and the perception of members, non-members and village leaders that their 
operations do contribute to poverty alleviation. Now that many institutions are at least 
several years old, sponsoring donors are increasingly expecting them to become 
financially self-sufficient. At the same time government policies such as subsidising 
official interest rates and instituting high minimum legal capital requirements make it 
very difficult for these institutions to attract a volume of savings that would be consistent 
with financial self-sufficiency. A constricted savings volume also contributes to the 
situation whereby NMPs are forced to choose between offering smaller loans to a greater 
number of members or larger loans to fewer members.   
 
If these issues remain unaddressed, two scenarios are likely to eventuate – neither of 
which is appealing from the perspective of helping the poor. The first is that donors will 
pull the plug on programs that fail to reach financial self-sufficiency or they will be 
forced to close by the government for failing to reach minimum capital requirements. The 
second is that current NMPs will switch from their current development orientation to 
more commercial objectives in order to survive – they will, in effect, cease to be 
microfinance institutions that focus on poverty alleviation. If financial markets in 
developing countries were complete and not subject to market failure, a distinction need 
not be drawn between development and commercial objectives. In reality however, many 
market failures do exist and there are often large divergences between the financial and 
social returns to lending (Kane, 1983). Both of the above scenarios would be extremely 
unfortunate given that nearly 70 percent of poor rural households in Vietnam still do not 
have access to vital credit services (Table 1).  
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